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DOSCHER: THE SECOND CIRCUIT FREES ITSELF FROM ITS PRIOR LOOK THROUGH 
APPROACH, FUELING A CIRCUIT SPLIT 
By 
Peter Nelson* 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
In Doscher v. Seaport, the Second Circuit held that the existence of federal-
question jurisdiction over a Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) § 10 petition to vacate turns 
on whether the district court would otherwise possess jurisdiction over the underlying 
dispute, rather than a “face-of-the-petition” inquiry.1 This new adoption of the look 
through approach overturned Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns.2 The Second Circuit 
determined that the look through approach applies equally to § 10 and § 4 of the FAA by 
extension of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Vaden v. Discover Bank3  (covering motions 
to compel arbitration) to vacatur petitions.4 The Second Circuit reasoned that the 
jurisdictional context of Vaden, arising from underlying disputes, together with the 
practical consequences of failing to extend the look through approach to jurisdictional 
inquiries, justifies extending the look through approach to vacatur petitions.5 
Furthermore, the congressional intent of a substantive review of arbitral awards, 
established in § 10, is satisfied by further application of the look through approach.6 The 
Second Circuit’s position is controversial in light of a Third Circuit case issued eleven 
days after the Doscher decision.7 In Goldman v. Citigroup, the Third Circuit held that an 
extension of the look through approach to § 10 petitions violates the federal interest in 
promoting the enforceability of arbitration agreements.8 The two cases differ in their 
interpretation and extension of Vaden, highlighting a need for clarification over the 
application of the look through approach to § 10 petitions. 
                                                 
* Peter Nelson is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2018 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 2016) 
2 See Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that courts may not “look 
through” petitions to determine if the underlying dispute involves substantial questions of federal law). 
3  Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009). 
4 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 388. 
5 Id. at 386. 
6 Id. 
7 See Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Markets Inc., 834 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2016). 
8 Id. at 255-56. 
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II.  BACKGROUND  
On October 22, 2013, a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitral 
panel awarded Drew Doscher nearly $2.3 million against his former employers.9 Doscher 
was a former co-head of sales and trading for The Seaport Group, LLC and Sea Port 
Securities, LLC (jointly called Seaport). He commenced arbitration against the two 
founders of Seaport, his counterpart co-head of sales and three other Respondents.10 
Seaport and Doscher are “Associated Persons” under FINRA rules and “engaged in the 
investment banking or securities business who [are] directly or indirectly controlled by a 
FINRA member” and subsequently bound to arbitration under FINRA rule 13200.11 
Doscher’s first statement of claim accused Respondents of retaliatory discharge, unjust 
enrichment and breach of contract, but was amended to include securities fraud under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b–5 of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5.12 The arbitral 
panel’s award was significantly less than the $15 million Doscher sought, and on January 
20, 2015, Doscher filed a 9 U.S.C. § 1013 petition following the panel’s award.14 
Doscher filed his § 10 petition in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York and included two grounds for vacatur of the arbitral panel’s 
award.15 First, under § 10(a)(3),16 Doscher claimed that the arbitral panel neglected to 
ensure that documentary evidence was made available to him.17 Second, he claimed the 
                                                 
9 See generally Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, No. 15-CV-384 JMF, 2015 WL 4643159 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 5, 2015), vacated, 832 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 2016). 
10 See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 374. 
11 Doscher, LLC, No. 15-CV-384 JMF, 2015 WL 4643159, at * 1 (citing FINRA Rule 13200, available 
at http://fmra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4203). 
12 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 374. 
13 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012) (“In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district 
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to 
the arbitration--(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there 
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty 
of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any 
party have been prejudiced; or (4)  where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed 
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”). 
14 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 374-75. 
15 Id. at 375. 
16 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2012) (stating that vacatur is appropriate “where the arbitrators were guilty of 
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any 
party have been prejudiced”).  
17 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 375. 
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arbitral panel violated FINRA Rule 13505 requiring the parties to cooperate in 
discovery.18 FINRA Rule 13505 is a federal law; therefore, Doscher claimed that his 
petition facially stated a federal question granting federal-question jurisdiction.19 
Additionally, Doscher asserted that his § 10(b)20 claim automatically granted federal-
question jurisdiction.21  
The District Court dismissed Doscher’s jurisdictional arguments.22 The court 
maintained that no question of federal law was presented by violations of internal FINRA 
rules.23 Furthermore, the court held that the Greenberg decision rejected reliance on a § 
10(b)24 claim for jurisdiction.25 Consequently, the District Court dismissed Doscher’s 
petition for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.26 Doscher later appealed to the Second 
Circuit to contest both the ruling of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the 
continuing validity of Greenberg.27  
 
III. Court’s Analysis 
 
A. Doscher Presented No Facial Claim Regarding Manifest Disregard of Federal 
Law. 
 
 The Second Circuit dismissed Doscher’s first jurisdictional argument concerning 
the arbitral panel’s violation of federal FINRA rules.28 Although federal law imposes 
obligations on self-regulatory organizations (SRO’s) (including FINRA), the law imposes 
no obligations on arbitral panels when applying those rules.29 Because Doscher’s claim 
                                                 
18 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 375. 
19 Id. 
20 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2012) (“If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the 
award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators”). 
21 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 375. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2012) (stating that “if an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement 
required the award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the 
arbitrators”). 
25 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 375. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 375-76. 
29 Id. at 376. 
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implicated the arbitral panel rather than FINRA, the asserted violation was too attenuated 
to trigger federal-question jurisdiction on its own.30 Cementing the conclusion that 
Doscher’s petition failed to present a facial claim regarding manifest disregard of federal 
law was the Merrill Lynch v. Manning case.31 In Manning, the Supreme Court held that a 
violation of an SRO rule grants federal question jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(a) in 
two instances: (1) those asserting an Exchange Act cause of action; and (2) where the 
Exchange Act was breached or another federal statute requirement was infringed.32 
Importantly, the Exchange Act “imposes no duty to comply with FINRA rules either on 
the arbitrators or non-SRO parties to arbitration,” disqualifying Doscher’s initial 
jurisdictional claim.33  
  
B. The Look Through Approach Applies to Both § 4 and § 10 of the FAA. 
  
In Greenberg v. Bear Stearns, the Second Circuit rejected the look through 
approach for § 10 petitions based exclusively on the holding of Westmoreland v. Findlay, 
which denied the look through approach to § 4 petitions.34 Westmoreland held that the 
“save for” clause35 in § 4 repudiated the “ouster theory,”36 displaying Congress’ intention 
to preserve federal court jurisdiction despite the presence of an agreement to arbitrate.37 
Furthermore, provisions lacking the “save for” clause had previously been interpreted to 
exclude jurisdiction in favor of the greater federal interest of promoting arbitration.38 
Greenberg maintained that: 
                                                 
30 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 376. 
31 Id. at 377. 
32 Id. (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1569 (2016)). 
33 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 377. 
34 See Greenberg, 220 F.3d at 24 (holding that district courts have federal-question jurisdiction over § 10 
petitions only if the petition states a substantial federal question on its face; essentially, a district court may 
not “look through”  the petition to determine if the underlying dispute that was subject to arbitration 
involved substantial questions of federal law—the claim must state on its face that an arbitral panel 
disregarded a federal law). 
35 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to 
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save 
for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action . . . for an order directing that 
such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement” (emphasis added)). 
36 See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 379 (mentioning that the “ouster theory” is a “common law principle that an 
agreement to arbitrate would oust the federal courts of jurisdiction”). 
37 Id. (citing Westmoreland Capital Corp. v. Findlay, 100 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 1996), abrogated by 
Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 173 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2009)). 
38 See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 379 (quoting Westmoreland, 100 F.3d at 268). 
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As with a motion under § 4, the only federal rights that a motion under § 
10 necessarily implicates are those created by the FAA itself, which rights 
do not give rise to federal question jurisdiction. In both contexts, there is 
no necessary link between the requested relief and the character of the 
underlying dispute.39   
 Crucially, Vaden holds that “[a] federal court may ‘look through’ a § 4 petition to 
determine whether it is predicated on an action that ‘arises under’ federal law.”40 The 
Westmoreland case was expressly overruled by Vaden, holding that the “save for” clause 
of § 4 properly indicates a district court’s assumption of the absence of an arbitration 
agreement, requiring the determination of whether jurisdiction exists over the 
“substantive conflict between the parties.”41 The central issue in Vaden was whether a § 4 
petition to compel arbitration established federal question jurisdiction by seeking to 
enforce a state law arbitration obligation.42 The question was whether federal question 
jurisdiction exists where the underlying dispute raises a federal question, but the § 4 
petition does not.43 Under Vaden, this jurisdictional determination requires a court to 
examine the “underlying dispute,” despite the fact that the purpose of § 4 petitions to 
compel arbitration is to have arbitrators resolve the merits, rather than the courts.44 
  
 C. Greenberg is Inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Vaden. 
 
 Despite lacking the “save for” language of § 4, the Second Circuit reasoned that § 
10 is to be construed in favor of the look through approach because of (1) the 
jurisdictional context of Vaden and (2) the practical consequences of barring the approach 
to only one section.45 In Vaden, the basis for jurisdiction was 28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal 
question jurisdiction, as it was in Doscher.46 Furthermore, the federal question, required 
by § 1331, “arose from the underlying dispute, not the face of the petition” in Vaden.47 
Additionally, the Second Circuit argued that a federal court’s jurisdiction cannot differ 
                                                 
39 See Greenberg, 220 F.3d at 26. 
40 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 380 (quoting Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 62 (2009)). 
41 Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62. 
42 Id. at 49. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 62-63. 
45 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 382-83. 




between § 4 and other sections considering that “§ 4 of the FAA does not enlarge federal-
court jurisdiction.”48 
 The Second Circuit identified a “tension” between the two controlling principles 
of Vaden: first, the emphasis on the text of § 4 when concluding a court has federal-
question jurisdiction over the underlying dispute, and second, that the provisions of the 
FAA do not affect a federal court’s jurisdiction.49 If the first point of emphasis leads to 
the conclusion that the absence of the “save for” clause in § 10 justifies the Greenberg 
ruling, then § 4 is used as an expansion of jurisdiction, which is forbidden by Vaden.50 
Therefore, the Second Circuit reasoned that Greenberg must be rejected in favor of 
allowing the jurisdictional inquiry to extend to the underlying dispute.51 Furthermore, the 
court claimed that the “save for” clause52 is construed to define the availability of the 
remedy instead of jurisdiction, due to Congress’ intent to broadly compel arbitration in § 
4’s authorization of arbitration in “every dispute over which Title 28 confers 
jurisdiction.”53 The Second Circuit reasoned that the FAA’s other sections establish their 
authorizing language according to geography and not the jurisdiction of the issuing 
court.54 
 The Second Circuit cited Congress’ intent to “create a body of federal substantive 
law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the 
Act” when construing Vaden’s  support of the look through approach in § 4 to § 10.55 
Additionally, the FAA constrains the role of courts where arbitration agreements exist; 
however, the Second Circuit maintains that courts still have an ability to enforce 
legislative remedies for arbitral disputes in which they would otherwise have 
jurisdiction.56 
 Finally, the Second Circuit held that a broader application of the look through 
approach “prevents absurd and illogical discrepancies.”57 The “face-of-the-petition” 
                                                 
48 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 383 (quoting Vaden, 556 U.S. at 66). 
49 Id. at 384. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
53 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 384. 
54 Id. at 384-85 (asserting that the FAA section compelling attendance of witnesses (9 U.S.C. § 7) uses a 
“geographical hook” by limiting its authorization to district courts for the district in which arbitrators sit 
and where an award was granted). 
55 Id. at 385 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) 
(emphasis added). 




approach identified in Vaden resulted in the failure to accommodate § 4 petitioners with 
the ability to remove a suit to federal court.58 Importantly, enforcement was not the only 
goal of Congress in passing the FAA according to the court.59 The Second Circuit 
maintained that Congress intended a “substantive-albeit limited-review” of arbitration 
awards by enacting rules for vacatur and modification.60 The court cautioned that under a 
face-of-the-petition approach, lawyers are encouraged to preserve access to federal courts 
for potential disputes arising in arbitration by filing parallel federal suits.61 This perverse 
incentive flies in the face of Congress’ intent to promote arbitration as an efficient 
alternative to litigation in the context of § 4 petitions, but extends to § 10 petitions 
according to the Second Circuit.62 
 Doscher holds that courts faced with § 10 petitions may “look through the petition 
to the underlying dispute, applying to it the ordinary rules of federal-question jurisdiction 
and the principles laid out by the majority in Vaden,” by adopting the following rules: 
first, where a district court has jurisdiction over the underlying dispute under § 1331 
standards, federal-question jurisdiction exists for an FAA petition; second, the § 4 “save 
for” clause displays congressional authorization for compulsory arbitration in any district 





 The Second Circuit’s holding in Doscher effectively expands the appealability of 
arbitration decisions whose petitions may not facially implicate federal rules.64 While 
adopting the look through approach for § 4 motions to compel arbitration ensures the 
enforceability of arbitral agreements,65 allowing the same approach to § 10 vacatur 
petitions has the opposite effect. The adoption of the look through approach removes a 
barrier to federal question jurisdiction in § 10 proceedings, making it easier for federal 
courts to assess the legitimacy and procedure of arbitral awards. Section 2 of the FAA 
                                                 
58 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 386. 
59 Id. at 387 (asserting that if enforcement were Congress’ only goal, it would only have passed § 2 and § 
3). 
60 Id. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 388. 
64 Id. at 388-89. 
65 See generally Vaden, 556 U.S. at 65. 
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references the validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of arbitral agreements.66 Vaden’s 
effective expansion of jurisdiction for § 4 motions to compel enhances the validity, 
irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate by increasing the probability 
that a federal court hears motions to compel arbitration.67 However, the “irrevocability” 
of arbitration agreements established by § 2 comes into question where courts’ 
jurisdiction to rule on vacatur petitions is expanded. Additionally, the limited statutory 
grounds for vacatur in § 10 indicate by their limited number a congressional policy 
favoring enforcement of arbitral awards,68 which may be frustrated by an expansion of 
federal question jurisdiction with the new application of the look through approach. 
 Nevertheless, the drafters of the FAA provided a remedy to the dangers of both 
fraud and prejudiced proceedings in arbitral proceedings through § 10. Extending the 
look through approach to § 10 petitions strengthens the § 10 remedy in allowing a deeper 
consideration of the merits of a dispute. Courts have consistently lost jurisdiction over 
threshold inquiries of arbitration to the arbitrators themselves.69 The Doscher decision 
seems to be a response to that trend by tightening the Second Circuit’s grasp over the 
appealability of arbitral decisions Today, federal courts in the Second Circuit may 
penetrate deep into the record to salvage federal question jurisdiction. Practitioners in the 
Second Circuit must understand that arbitral awards are now susceptible to an expanded 
review and potential interference from courts.  It is unlikely that parties may contract out 
of the look through approach in their arbitral clauses, considering that the Supreme Court 
has held that private parties may not contractually impose their own standards on courts 
reviewing arbitration awards.70 However, this prohibition exists only in reference to the 




 The Third Circuit recently tried a case significantly similar to Doscher, but with 
an irreconcilable holding.72 In Goldman v. Citigroup, a FINRA arbitration proceeding 
                                                 
66 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“[A]n agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy 
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”). 
67 See generally Vaden, 556 U.S. at 65. 
68 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 90 (7th ed. 
2015). 
69 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (U.S. 1995) (holding that jurisdictional claims 
may be sent to the arbitrator by contract); see also Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 
(U.S. 2013) (holding that questions of class arbitrability are decided by the arbitrator). 
70 See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (U.S. 2008) (holding that §9-11 of the FAA are 
exclusive and cannot be expanded through contractual agreement). 
71 Id. 
72 See Goldman, 834 F.3d at 242. 
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alleged securities fraud against Citigroup under the Securities Exchange Act.73 The 
arbitral panel dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claims after an initial mediation failed.74 Plaintiffs 
filed a § 10 motion to vacate the arbitration award and asserted that the arbitral panel 
exhibited partiality in favor of defendants.75 The district court granted dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction, which became the issue on appeal.76 
 Citing Moses H. Cone, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the 
FAA provides no federal cause of action establishing federal question jurisdiction, but 
instead requires an “independent basis” for federal jurisdiction.77 The Third Circuit 
previously held in the Coastal General case that to succeed in a § 10 motion to vacate, 
“[n]ot only must federal jurisdiction exist aside from the Arbitration Act, but the 
independent basis must appear on the face of the complaint.”78 To overcome Coastal 
General’s rejection of the look through approach for § 10 vacatur motions, the plaintiffs 
pointed to Vaden as an intervening change in the law.79 The Third Circuit admitted that 
there “may be some superficial appeal to treating a § 10 motion to vacate an arbitration 
award in the same manner as a § 4 motion,” but maintained that “a close reading of 
Vaden” and the FAA forecloses the argument.”80 
 According to the Third Circuit, Vaden clearly upheld the well-pleaded complaint 
rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in application to the FAA as a whole.81 Importantly, the court 
noted that Vaden’s relaxation of the well-pleaded complaint rule for § 4 petitions was 
based on the unique text of § 4’s “save for” clause.82 Section 10 lacks the “save for” 
                                                 
73 Goldman, 834 F.3d at 242. 
74 Id. (noting that allegations of spying during the confidential mediation were made against Citigroup by 
the Goldmans). 
75 Id. (noting that the Goldmans claimed that the “FINRA arbitration panel behaved improperly in that it 
demanded ‘voluminous’ and irrelevant discovery from them, did not permit sufficient discovery of CGMI's 
documents, exhibited partiality towards CGMI, and ‘refused to resign’ at the Goldmans' request”). 
76 Id. (noting that the district court ruled that the FAA does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction on 
its own, and that federal question jurisdiction, independent of the FAA, would be required with an absence 
of diverse parties in this case). 
77 Id. at 250 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32). 
78 Goldman, 834 F.3d at 252 (citing Virgin Islands Hous. Auth. v. Coastal Gen. Const. Servs. Corp., 27 
F.3d 911 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
79 Id. (referencing the Plaintiffs’ argument that Vaden’s validation of the look through approach should be 
applied to § 10 vacatur motions). 
80 Id. 
81 See id. at 252-53 (noting that under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “a suit ‘arises under’ federal law 
‘only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal law]”). 
82 Id. at 253 (quoting Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62) (“[t]he text of § 4 drives our conclusion that a federal court 




clause of § 4, excluding Vaden’s textual consideration from application to § 10.83 
Furthermore, Vaden’s identification of “practical consequences” (the incentive to file a 
parallel suit prior to arbitration to preserve federal jurisdiction) does not apply to § 10 
because the section makes “no reference to the subject matter of the dispute” in its  
vacatur provision.84 In essence, § 10 makes no demand for a court to consider whether it 
has jurisdiction over the “subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between 
the parties” as referenced in § 4, according to the Third Circuit.85 
 The Third Circuit’s position is buttressed by the Seventh Circuit’s ruling, prior to 
Vaden, that “there was ‘no reason to artificially import the language’ of § 4 into § 10.”86 
The Seventh Circuit determined that Congress intended to treat motions to compel and 
motions to vacate differently because “[t]he central federal interest was enforcement of 
agreements to arbitrate, not review of arbitration decisions.”87 This interest rationalizes 
granting jurisdiction to courts otherwise having jurisdiction only in the enforcement of 
arbitral clauses. However, once the arbitral agreement is enforced, “there exists no 
compelling need for the federal courts to be involved, unless a federal question is actually 
at issue.”88 
 Examining Vaden’s “practical consequences” argument for a second time, the 
Third Circuit praises the Seventh Circuit’s policy rationale for “mesh[ing] exactly” with 
Vaden.89 Extending the look through approach to § 4 efficiently compels arbitration and 
dis-incentivizes filing preliminary federal suits; but this approach is inapplicable to § 10 
petitions challenging the “procedural propriety of the arbitration,” wholly unrelated to the 
underlying subject matter of the issue.90 Goldman forbids the look through approach for § 
10 motions to vacate, instead opting for the traditional well-pleaded complaint rule for 
the establishment of federal question jurisdiction. 91 
 Goldman potently criticizes the Second Circuit’s decision in Doscher. Critical to 
both opinions is the “save for” clause of § 4. The Second Circuit’s argument for 
                                                 
83 Goldman, 834 F.3d at 253. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 254 (citing Kasap v. Folger Nolan Fleming & Douglas, Inc., 166 F.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 
1999)). 
87 Id. (citing Minor v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 94 F.3d 1103, 1107 (7th Cir. 1996). 
88 Goldman, 834 F.3d at 254 (citing Minor, 94 F.3d at 1107). 
89 Id.  
90 Id. 
91 See id. at 255 (holding that “the motion to vacate must, on its face, “necessarily raise a stated federal 
issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any 
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities”). 
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extension of the look through approach, despite the absence of the “save for” clause in § 
10, seems to disqualify the Third Circuit’s assertion that the absence of the clause forbids 
the extension of the look through approach. Because the FAA cannot expand jurisdiction 
according to Vaden,92 the Second Circuit correctly assumes that the presence of the “save 
for” clause in § 4 is not controlling in the prescription of the look through approach. 
 The Third Circuit’s reading of § 10 establishes that the underlying subject matter 
of the dispute is not mentioned in the statutory grounds for vacatur.93 This creates a  
presumption of congressional intent to keep courts from assessing the subject matter of a 
dispute when making jurisdictional inquiries. However, the Second Circuit’s emphasis 
that Congress’ intent with the FAA was to create federal law “applicable to any 
arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act”94 competes with the Third Circuit’s 
position if it is presumed that the look through approach should itself apply broadly. The 
Third Circuit’s position is at its strongest when referencing congressional intent to 
enforce arbitration agreements, rather than their review. Despite this point, it is unclear 
from the express language of § 10 how far a court may look into a dispute for the purpose 
of determining whether federal question jurisdiction exists. 
Notably, in Hall Street v. Mattel, the Supreme Court declared that a limited 
review of arbitration decisions is necessary to preserve the expediency and efficiency of 
arbitration, distinct from its previous assertions that Congress’ intent was the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements under the FAA.95 Neither purpose is served by the Second 
Circuit’s insistence on penetrating deeper into records to salvage federal question 
jurisdiction. Proceedings are lengthened where appeal provisions are relaxed, and the 
expediency of arbitration proceedings vanishes with the threat of additional litigation. 
Moreover, the enforceability of arbitral agreements comes into question where a lax 
vacatur policy looms over arbitration awards. However, the look through approach 
attempts to address the perverse incentive of filing parallel court proceedings with 
arbitration to preserve federal question jurisdiction.96 Unfortunately, the look through 
approach merely substitutes excess litigation after an award has been rendered in hopes 
of avoiding parallel litigation at the outset of arbitration. The look through approach thus 
fails to avoid the surplus litigation contemplated by the Second Circuit. 
                                                 
92 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 384. 
93 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012). 
94 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 385. 
95 See generally Hall St. Assocs, 552 U.S. 576 (U.S. 2008); but see Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 29 (holding 
that “[t]he Arbitration Act calls for a summary and speedy disposition of motions or petitions to enforce 
arbitration clauses”). 
96 Doscher, 832 F.3d at 387. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s Vaden decision left unresolved questions regarding the 
scope of the look through approach beyond § 4 petitions to compel arbitration. Doscher 
results in a deeper focus on the underlying dispute for the determination of federal 
question jurisdiction in § 10 vacatur petitions by rejecting a face-of-the-petition inquiry 
for federal question jurisdiction. The Second Circuit now extends the look through 
approach to § 10 petitions for vacatur in what has become a controversial interpretation 
of Vaden. The Doscher decision is irreconcilable with the Third Circuit’s position in the 
recent Goldman case. These differing holdings display a glaring need for clarification in 
the wake of Vaden. 
